This paper presents a quantum mechanical version of the piggy-bank cryptography protocol. The basic piggybank cryptography idea is to use two communications: one with the encrypted message, and the other regarding the encryption transformation which the receiver must decipher first. In the quantum mechanical version of the protocol, the encrypting unitary transformation information is sent separately but just deciphering it is not enough to break the system. The proposed quantum protocol consists of two stages.
Introduction
There exist at least two separate paradigm of the secure communication system from the perspective of the usage of keys: (i) the standard cryptographic scheme where the key is required at both ends (and the key can be symmetric or non-symmetric) [1] , and (ii) where the key information is sent separately using a different communication in such a manner that its decipherment by the eavesdropper in itself does not break the communication (piggybank protocol of [2] ). The piggybank paradigm breaks up the secret communication into two parts somewhat in the spirit of recursive hiding of secrets [3] , the interlock protocol [4] and the ElGamal cipher [5] , excepting that it considers the transformation in a more general setting. This potentially makes the task of the eavesdropper harder because she must break both the messages correctly in order to break the system. It also makes it possible to trade off the complexity of the two transformations in a manner that makes it suitable for use in some compute-capacity limited applications.
Alice deposits the secret into the box together with the decryption key of a coded letter. In addition, she prepares a letter to be sent separately. The piggy bank and the letter are sent back to Bob.
The letter is required to authenticate the contents of the locked piggybank box. It cannot be in plain text because the content list itself is a secret. Bob opens the box, obtains the key and then unlocks the secret within the letter using the key. In this implementation of the piggybank protocol for data, Bob obtains secret message (S) and key which is h(S).
Step1. Bob starts with a random number R and the piggy bank transformation is represents by a one way transmission f(R)= mod e R n, where n is a composite number with factors known only to him; e is the publicly known encryption exponent. Step3. Bob uses his secret inverse transformation to first recover K and having found it he can recover S. Assuming that this protocol uses a cryptographically strong random number generation algorithm, it makes it difficult for the eavesdropper to guess the value of R and break the public encryption key e. Apart from random number generation use of a complex hash function will also prevent the protocol from Man in the middle attack. Even if Eve tries to attack and gets hold of the secret message, Alice and Bob can introduce classical authentication resource say onetime pad, which might be able to recognize the misinformation from Eve, if any.
The Proposed Quantum Protocol
Consider the arrangement of Figure 1 , where
In other words, rotations are limited to linear polarization. The sequence of operations in the protocol is as follows:
Step 1. Bob applies the transformation B U on X, a random polarization state which is the cover state, and sends n qubits of it to Alice.
Step 2. This protocol assumes that the eavesdropper cannot estimate the original polarizations [9] - [11] and, of course, due to the no-cloning theorem he cannot make multiple copies of the transmitted photons. If m =1, the system is provably secure.
Alice applies
To consider the value of n, let the tomographic scheme used by Bob extract log 2 n bits of information regarding the polarization angle or the transformation A U . If Bob is going to choose out of k discrete angles that are equally spaced then n = 2 k .
The eavesdropper will need n photons to determine the angle. Therefore, the system would be safe as long as the number of photons being used is less than 2n. If Even siphons off too many photons, she would be detected. There is also an inverse relationship between n and m. If a large n is used, m should be small and vice versa. Table 1 discusses the Game theoretic view of the problem where Eve is involved in the system. The system is meant to be safe until the number of photons is less than 2n. The challenge will be to use the inverse relationship between n and m to force Eve into siphoning few photons which will keep the system safe. 
